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ABSTRACT:
We develop some two-person zero-sum game formulations of search
and evasion problems. By employing a game theoretic approach, we
allow the hider, as well as the searcher, to choose a strategy. This is
in contrast to most search models which assume a stationary or passive
hider. Both non-sequential.and sequential search games are investigated.
Some interesting aspects of the non- sequential game and an example of
an antisubmarine search problem are given. The sequential games con-
sist of a sequence of moves. When the players move, they not only de-
termine a payoff but also the probability that the game terminates before
the next move. When at most a finite number of moves is allowed, we
prove that a solution may be found by solving a recursive sequence of
matrix games. When the number of moves is not bounded, the game is
characterized by a special type of non-linear program. The solution
to this program can be approximated by successive perturbations of a
related linear program. Finally, we obtain the result that a pair of
strategies minimaxes the expected duration of the game if and only if
these strategies also maximin the probability of termination in one step.
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We investigate some two-person zero-sum games which typically
arise in search and evasion settings. One of the classical problems in
the theory of search is to determine an optimal division of search effort
among n-cells. We explore this problem when both the searcher (PI)
and the hider (P2) can choose a cell on each move. Here we are allowing
for the active participation of the hider as opposed to other formulations
which require a stationary hider. An n-cell search game, as we call it,
and two sequential extensions of the n-cell game are proposed.
We summarize our game formulations and results. In the n-cell
game, every play consists of exactly one move. The payoff function is
taken to be the probability that PI detects P2. This payoff is particu-
larly appealing for Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) applications. With
the indicated payoff, a zero -sum assumption corresponds to the role of
an evader for P2. To illustrate this point, an example of a typical ASW
situation is given. We also show how a constrained-game extension can
be employed to include additional tactical information.
The n-cell game is extended to a sequential game. In turn, we con-
sider sequential games consisting of a finite number and an infinite number
of moves. On each move, the players not only determine an immediate
payoff, but they also determine the probability that the game terminates




before the next move. This game may be thought of as a matrix game
which is played again with probability determined by the players.
For the finite sequential game, we show how optimal strategies and
the value may be computed by dynamic programming. In particular, the
solution of the game can be found by solving a recursive sequence of
matrix games. The amount of computational effort is usually much less
than would be required by solution of the game in normal form.
When an infinite number of moves is allowed, we show how to
characterize the resulting sequential game by a special type of non-
linear program. If one of the variables in the constraint set of this
non-linear program is held fixed, it becomes a linear program. To
find the solution of the sequential game, we must adjust this variable in
the constraint set to make the optimal value of the objective function equal
to zero. We show how to perturb the linear program and thereby ap-
proximate the game solution to within desired accuracy.
Many of the search models which appear in the literature assume a
stationary hider. Models of this type are given by Koopman [9] ,
Bellman [1], Pollock [15], Dobbie [ 7] , and MacQueen [ 12] . On the
other hand, game formulations which allow the hider to choose strategies
are presented by von Neumann £ 19] , Norris[14], and Neuts [ 13] . Our
games are generalizations and extensions of these search games. In
particular, one of von Neumann's [19] search games is a special case
of the n-cell search game which is presented in section 2.

2. THE N-CELL SEARCH GAME
2. 1 Formulation
To formulate the n-cell search game, we assume that the searcher
has one detection device and that there is only one hider. Later, we
relax these assumptions. The search region of interest is divided into
n-cells. A pure strategy for the searcher (PI) is a cell to search (locate
his detection device) and a pure strategy for the hider (P2) is a cell in
which to hide. A play consists of exactly one simultaneous choice of
strategies (move) or, of course, the players may choose their strate-
gies sequentially provided the second choice is made in ignorance of
the first.
To define the payoffs, we assume that if PI looks in cell i and P2
hides in cell j , then PI detects P2 with probability a. . (i, j = 1, . . . , n) .
Let Abe the n x n payoff matr ix A = ( a .
.
) .
. To embrace tactical encounters, we have postulated the payoff as a
probability of detection. Other search payoffs could be used as well.
We have also allowed the probability of detection to be a function of the
range between PI and P2. This feature is not included in most other de-
tection models.
Now, suppose that PI searches cell i with probability x. , and
suppose that P2 hides in cell j with probability y.. We require that
J





2 y. = 1 , y. £ , j = l,...,n .
j=i 3 J
Let X and Y be the nxl vectors X = (x , ... , x ) and Y = (y , ... , y )In In
Then X and Y are mixed strategies for PI and P2, respectively. If PI
chooses X and P2 chooses Y then, from elementary probability, PI de-
tects P2 with probability X AY. We assume that PI chooses X to maxL
t
mize his detection probability X AY. Now consider the case when P2
t
chooses Y to minimize X AY. Then we can interpret the motive of P2
as evasive action since P2 is attempting to minimize the probability that
he is detected. This action by P2 also gives rise to a zero-sum game.
It is important to note this relationship between evasion and a zero-sum
game. We henceforth restrict our discussion to zero-sum games.
1 tX denotes the vector X - transpose.

2. 2 An Example
To illustrate the n-cell game, consider the following tactical example.
Suppose a submarine must pass through a channel to get from its base to
its patrol area. The searcher,' PI, wishes to locate a detection device in
the channel to detect submarines as they pass through. For convenience,
we assume that the search region is divided into 15 cells, as shown in
Figure 1. We assume that PI wants to locate his device in one of these
cells to maximin the probability of detection.
SEARCH REGION
M





The Search Region and Cells
Figure 1
This type hi situation was encountered in the Bay of Biscay during
World War II, Sl;ernhell and Thorndike [18].

To obtain the payoff matrix, we need the detection probabilities.
These probabilities are found from the probability of detection versus


























12 3 4 5
R = RANGE IN NUMBER OF CELLS
Probability of Detection versus Range
Figure 2
To find the payoff matrix, suppose that PI locates his detection device
in cell 5, and P2 hides in cell 8; then the range is three cells, and the
probability of detection, from Figure 2, is a = 0. 367. The other ele-
5*2
ments of the payoff matrix A are determined in a similar manner, and the
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The value and optimal strategies (solution) of the game can now be
computed. The solution was computed by linear programming, and it is
tabulated in Figure 4. From this figure, we observe how the boundaries
of the search region affect the searching strategy. A substantial amount
of the effort is allocated to the end cells. Notice that the only data re-










1 0. 258 1 0. 274 2 0. 317
5 0. 069 6 0. 234 6 0. 099
6 0. 165 10 0. 165 8 0. 168
10 0. 234 11 0. 069 10 0. 099
15 0. 274 15 0. 258 14 0. 317
all other y. =
J
all other y. =
J
all other x. =
J
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Before leaving this subject, we point out some possible extensions.
Additional probabilistic information can be. included in the n-cell game
by considering a constrained game extension. The elegant development
of a constrained game by Charnes [2] can then be applied directly. To
illustrate the type of constraints which may arise, suppose that the
searcher can bound the probability that the hider chooses certain cells,
i. e. , the searcher determines numbers L. and U. (0 £ L. £ U. £ 1 ) such
J J J J
that
(1) L. * y. < U. .
J J J
These bounds may arise from intelligence or previous contacts.
Constraints of the type in equation (1) and, in general, any linear ine-
qualities can be included in a constrained game formulation. The method
of Charnes [2] can then be employed.
It is also desirable to relax the assumption that PI has only one de-
» tection device. This can be easily accomplished by redefining Pi's pure
strategies in the following way. For simplicity, suppose PI has two de-
tection devices. Then let each pure strategy for PI be the two -tuple (k, i)
where cell k denotes the location of device 1 and cell i is the location of
device 2. Now the probability of detection can be calculated for each such
pure strategy, and again an ordinary matrix game is obtained. In a
similar way, we can also allow P2 to consist of two or more hiders.
Next, we formulate a finite sequential version of the n-cell search game.
10

3. THE FINITE SEQUENTIAL GAME
3. 1 Formulation
First, we discuss the elements of the finite sequential game, and
then we proceed with the mathematical formulation. A play of the game
consists of, at most, a finite number (N) of moves. On each move, when
the game has* not terminated, the players are faced with a two-person
zero-sum game. In our formulation, we shall use the n-cell game as the
two-person zero-sum game for each move. When the players move, they
each choose a strategy which determines a zero-sum payoff from player 2
to player 1 and a probability that the game terminates before the next
move. We wish to find an optimal strategy for each player which mini-
maxes the expected accumulated payments received by player 1.
The recursive optimization technique which we will propose has also
been discussed by other authors. Kuhn [10] (1953) gave his theorem on
games of perfect recall which paved the way for further work. Shapley
[17] (1953) was the first to point out the recursive character of a gener-
alization of this game, although he did not deal with the finite case. Later
contributions were made by Bellman [1] (1957), Everett [8] (1957),
Zachrisson [22] (1964), and Denardo [ 6] (1965).
; I
The payoffs and continuation! probabilities are now specified. Suppose
that PI searches cell i and P2 hi<j.?s in cell j on move r. Then the payoff

from P2 to PI is
a.. (r) i, j = 1, . . . ,
n
J
r = 1, . . . , N .
Also, when PI searches cell i and P2 hides in cell j on move r, the game
continues until move r + 1 with probability
p..(r) i, j = 1, . . . , n
r = 1, . . . , N - 1 .
We let A be the nxn matrix A = (a..(r)) and P the nxn matrix
r r ij r
P = (p. (r) ) . Hence, A is Pi's payoff matrix for move r and P is the
r ij r r
matrix of continuation probabilities for move r. We assume that the game
is zero sum and that PI is the maximizing player.
Next, we consider strategies for the players. We have assumed that
the continuation probability and payoff depend only on the choices available
for a particular move. It follows that the game is one of perfect recall as
defined by Kuhn [10]. Kuhn's theorem for a game of perfect recall asserts
that a "behavior strategy" is optimal. For this particular game, a behavior
strategy takes the following form: let X and Y be mixed strategies over
the alternatives available on move r for PI and P2, respectively. Let
X = (X , . . . , X ) be an N-tuple of the above mixed strategies for PI.
Then X is a behavior strategy for PI. Similarly, we define a behavior
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From Kuhn's theorem of perfect recall, the sets X and X contain optimal
game strategies for PI and P2, respectively; and we will, therefore,
m
limit our search for optimal strategies to these sets.
The total expected payoff for PI will be expressed in terms of fixed
strategies Xsl, Y6 X and the given information. If PI chooses the
strategy X 6 X for move r and P2 chooses Y 6 X , then the payoff6,7
r r r r
to PI for move r is
X* A Y r=l,...,N
r r r
and the game continues until move r + 1 with probability
X* P Y r=l,...,N-l .
r r r
Now the product of the probability that the game continues until move r
and the payoff for move r is
r-1
X A Y n X P Y^ r = 2, 3, . . . , N .
r r r , , h h hh=l
The expected accumulated payoff for N moves, v (X, Y) , is the sum
of the above terms
N r-1
(2) v. (X, Y) = X. A, Y. + L X A Y II X* P^ Y^ .
1 111 ^rrr 11 hhh
r=2 h=l
Since the game has a finite number of moves and a finite number of
strategies, it must have a value and optimal strategies. Recall that the
sets X and X contain optimal strategies. Tlprefore, the function
(j
v (X, Y) has at least one saddle point over thtUsets X and X.
1
von>,:umann and Morgenstern [21],
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3. 2 Recursive Solution
We show how to compute the minimax of equation (Z) by a recursive











r = 1, . . . , N .
Y = (Y , Y , ... , Y )
r r r + 1 N
Of course, we have X = X, and Y = Y. We rewrite equation (2) and
also define the scalar functions v (X , Y ) by
r r r
(3) v (X YJ-X1 A Y +(Xt P Y ) v (X Y ) r = 1 Nrrr rrr rrr r+i r+i r+i
v =0N+l
Now v ( X , Y ) may be interpreted as the expected accumulated pay-
r r r
ments received by PI on the last N - r + 1 moves of the game.
Equation (3) leads us to believe that the recursive optimization tech-
nique of dynamic programming can be employed. We will establish this




M1V i"*1 A Y + (X* P Y ) , "I '= I- ••• -N
I 6 2L YeX L r r r r r r'r+lj




^ £ ^ ^ £ ^
= X A Y + (X P Y ) v , .rrr rrrr + 1
The minimax theorem of von Neumann [21] establishes the existence of
X , Y , v as defined by equation (4). The following theorem then relatesrrr






Theorem 1 : v is, the value of the sequential game, and
A Ak AAA A
X = ( X , . . . , X ) , Y = ( Y , . . . , Y ) are optimal strategies for PI
and P2, respectively.
Proof: Since v (X, Y) from equation (3) is the expected payoff
function for the sequential game, a necessary and sufficient condition for
v to be the value of the game and X, Y optimal strategies is
v (X, Y) * v ^v (X, Y) all Xe X and Ye X .
We shall show that the above condition is satisfied by v , X, Y as de-
fined by (4). From (4), we have
(5) X* A Y +(Xt P Y)v , £ v £ ^AY +(X t P Y)v ,
,
r r r r r r+1 r r r r r r' r+1
all X e X , Y e x
r r r r
We begin an inductive argument





, , Y ,)^v , for some r and all Y
r + 1 r + 1 r+1 r+1 r
By definition,
v ( X~ , Y ) = X* A Y +(X t P Y)v (i
,
, Y
r r r. rrr rrr'r+l v r+l r+1
By the inductive assumption and X P Y ^ ,rrr




From the preceding equation and equation (5)
v ( X , Y ) ;> v all Y
r r r r r
Hence, by induction on r
v (X, Y) ;> v
x
all Y e Y
Similarly, we may establish
y(X, Y) £ v
x
all Xe X ;
therefore,
v (X, Y) £ v £ v (X, Y) all Xe I, Ye T
and the theorem is true.
In order to find the value and optimal strategies, we can solve
equation (4) recursively. But, each iteration of equation (4) requires the
solution of an ordinary matrix game. Now the solutions (value and optimal
strategies) of a matrix game can be found by solving a linear programming
/ 2/ formulation of the game. Hence, we can find the solutions of the sequen-
tial game by optimizing a sequence of N linear programs. Of course,
the amount of computational effort required by this method will usually
be substantially less than the amount required to solve the sequential
game in direct normal form.
Notice that by definition of X we have X = X = ( X, , X_ , . . . , X ).
< 1 1 1 Z N
2




4. THE INFINITE SEQUENTIAL GAME
4. 1 Formulation
In this section, we- allow an infinite number of moves in the sequential
game. Before giving an analytic formulation, we discuss some of the
features of the game. In the infinite sequential game, we do not assume
a maximum number of moves. The continuation probabilities alone con-
trol the termination of the game. However, we assume that the same
payoff matrix and the same continuation probability matrix are specified
for all moves. We further assume that the probability of continuing until
the next move is strictly less than one for all pairs of strategies. This
assumption guarantees boundedness of the expected accumulated payments
received by PI ; and it guarantees that the game terminates with proba-
bility one, although the number of moves may not be bounded. Now we
turn to a formal definition of the game under consideration.
As in the previous games, we assume that a search region is speci-
fied and that it is divided into n cells. If PI chooses cell i (i = 1, ... , n)
and P2 chooses cell j (j = 1, . . . , n) on move r (r = 1, 2, . . . ) , then PI




and the game cont/iues until move r + 1 with probability
(6) 7 * p.. < 1 .

Let P be the nxn matrix P = (p. . ) and A the nxn matrix A = (a. . ) . A
is the payoff matrix, and P is the matrix of continuation probabilities for
every move. We further assume that the game is zero sum and that PI
is the maximizing player.
The game which we have defined above is one of "perfect recall" ;
and by Kuhn's [ 10] theorem, a "behavior strategy" is optimal. If a
player uses a behavior strategy, he plays the same mixed strategy over
the alternatives in an information set each'time the information set is
reached, regardless of the past history of the game. Since the matrices
A and P apply to every move, the game has only one information set.
Therefore, a behavior strategy is simply a mixed strategy which is used
for every move of the game. We restrict our attention to these strategies.
Let X = (x , . . . , x ) and Y = (y , . . . , y ) be behavior strategies
(mixed strategies over the alternatives) for PI and P2, respectively. For
example, PI chooses alternative i with probability x. on every move. The
expected accumulated payment received by PI, v(X, Y) , when PI
chooses X and P2 chooses Y, is simply the sum over all r of the proba-
bility that the game lasts until move r times the payment to PI for move r,
00
(7) v(X, Y) = £ (Xt PY) r X*AY .
r=0
The above sum converges, since (6) implies £ X P Y < 1 for all strate-
./
gies X and Y. For convenience, we define the matrix Q = (q. . ) with
iJ





probabilities. Equation (7) may be written as
(8) v(X, Y) =
X AY X AY
1 - X1 P Y Xl QY
von Neumann [20] first established the existence of a unique value v and
A. A,
optimal strategies X and Y for the form in (8), i. e. , there exists a unique
real number v and strategies X, Y such that
(9)
X*AY ^ ' X t AY „ . „ . v v
=£ v ^ all strategies X, Y
X QY X QY
An elementary proof of this fact was subsequently given by Loomis [ 11] ,
and this result is a special case of Shapley's [17] more general
"stochastic game". Neuts [13] formulated and solved a special case of
the infinite sequential game. His P matrix was a diagonal matrix and




4. 2 Solution by Perturbation
There are no known methods for computing a solution to equation (9).
In this section, we develop a computational method to approximate a
solution to any desired degree to accuracy. The method is based on a
linear programming formulation of a matrix game with an unknown para-
meter in the constraints. We show that this parameter is equal to the
value of the game if and only if the optimal objective function of the linear
program is zero. The remainder of our discussion is then devoted to a
method for approximating the required value of the parameter.
To begin, we establish a lemma which relates the solution of the
infinite sequential game to the solution of an ordinary two-person zero-
sum game.
Lemma ; A necessary and sufficient condition for v to be the value
of the infinite sequential game and X, Y optimal strategies is that the
two-person zero-sum game with payoff matrix A - vQhas value zero
A, A,
and optimal strategies X, Y
.
Proof : For the matrix game A - vQ to have value zero and optimal
A Ai
strategies X, Y, it is necessary and sufficient that
(10) X
t (A - vQ) Y <: £ X l (A - vQ) Y all strategies X, Y .
t
But, X QY > for all strategies, X, Y . Hence, v, X , Y satisfy (10)
if and only if
.... Xt AY ^ ^ X tAY(10a) —
—




Equation (10a) is a necessary and sufficient condition for v to be the value
of the infinite sequential game and X, Y optimal strategies. Hence, the
lemma is true.
This lemma immediately suggests a method for computing v. The
general procedure is to choose a number s and compute the value of the
game A - s Q. If the value of A - s Q is zero, then s = v and we are
finished. If the value of A - s Q is not zero, then we want to choose a
new value of s, say s , such that the value of A - s Q is "closer" to
zero than the value of A - s Q . We begin by formulating the matrix game
A - s Q as a linear program.
Consider the linear program
Max u
(11) ue - X (A-sQ) ^
s
Xl e = 1
X ;>
where e is the nxl vector of all "ones", X is an nxl vector, s is a fixed
A




(11). Then from Charnes [2], X is an optimal strategy for PI and u is
s
the value of the game A - sQ, (s fixed). Of course, an optimal strategy
*>
i . *
Y for P2 is part of an optimal solution to the dual of (11), and Y is avail-
able' when (11) is solve< by the simplex method.






in s. This will allow us to perturb s in such a way that we move ur
s
closer to zero. We consider a perturbation from s to s + § in problem
(11), and we want to relate u to u _ . We add and subtract the vector
s s + §





- X* (A - (s + g) Q) - 5Xt Q <.
8
Xt e = 1
X s
We seek to obtain a linear programming formulation of the game
a / ,-\ rs * /i->\ i . = max _ minA - (s + Z ) Q from (12). Hence, we let q=. .q.., q=. .q..
i, J ij 1, J • ij
and then for g >
t t — t
(13) §qe £§XQ£§qe all strategies X .




- X* (A - (s + §) Q) <; ^qe'
X e = 1
X ;> .
Problem (1.4) is "less constrained" than (12). Therefore, the respective








Notice that the right-hand side of the constraints in (14) is a con^
stant vector. We bring this vector over to the left-hand side of the
constraints and make the change of variable
(16) u = u'-§f
to obtain the program




- X*(A - (s + § ) Q) <:
X e = 1
X i .
But, (17) is the desired linear programming formulation of the game







+ § q .
From (15) and the above equation




By using the left-hand side of (13), we get by a similar argument
u _ + £ q £ u
s + £ * H s
Thus, for £ >
(18) V §q '"s + ^'V §q ' § > °









(19) u -§q£u£u - § q, 5 < .
s s + § s
Equations (18) and (19) give the desired-relationships. We can choose
a starting value of s and then subsequently perturb u. toward zero.
s
To assist in choosing a starting value of s, we propose the following
method. Two numbers, m and M (m £ M), are determined such that
u ^ and u, £ 0. Then since u is a continuous function of s
,m M s
u =0 for some s in the range m £ s £ M. Furthermore, this value
s
of s is unique. We would then choose the initial value of s to satisfy-








. , Mq.. ^ a.. alii, j .
From the constraints of (11), we see that
n
a. mm _ * . .






u ;> , u , £m M
With certain restrictions on the elements a , we can derive tighter





This fact is clear //rom the foregoing derivation.
24

4. 3 Iterative Method
There are various methods which can be used in connection with
equations (18) and (19) to move from one value of s to another. We
propose one method here which will automatically change s and drive
u to zero. We find two numbers, b and § , for fixed s which will give
s
(21) -b £ u £ b .v
' s + §
By reference to (18) and (19), we find that
2u |u | (q -q)
(22) § = 3— , b = -— .
q+q q + q
The following method for approximating a solution to equation (9) can
now be started. For convenience, let u. be the optimal solution to (11)
•
. l •
when s. is the value of s in the constraint set.
l
Approximation Method
1. Choose a starting value s and calculate u from (11).





= s. +1+1 1 — -q+q
and calculate u.. , from (11).l+l v '
Let U = ( u , u , . . . ) be the sequence generated by the above
method. We now show that this sequence does indeed converge absolutely
to zero.







a = 2Ll£ ;
q + q
notice that £ a < 1 , and we also have
Since a —^ 0. we have |u I —^ 0. Because of this convergence, we
1 n •
can approximate the value of the game to any desired accuracy by the
above method.
We point out a few interesting features of the proposed method.
From step 2, the "driving force" which moves us from s. to s. is
directly proportional to the magnitude of u. . This feature serves to
drive u. rapidly toward zero. We also observe that when q" = "q, we will
have u = . This is a nice feature since "q = q" implies that all elements
of the Q matrix are equal and, therefore, the game reduces to an ordi-
nary matrix game (see equation (8) ) .
An alternative to the method which we have proposed here is to use
the contraction property of the operator T which is defined as
To = Val [ A - or P
]
where a is a scalar and Val[A - orPj denotes the value of the matrix




T a approaches the value of the infinite stochastic game for arbi-
trary a , and Charnes and Schroeder [5] have shown how to obtain a




4. 4 Tactical Payoffs and a Special Case
For tactical purposes, two particular payoffs are appealing. As in
the n-cell game, the payoff for each move may be the probability that
PI detects P2 in that move. Then, in both sequential games, the expected
accumulated payment received by PI will be the probability that PI de-
tects P2 in the game. The other payoff of interest is obtained by taking
all a.
.
(r) = 1 . Then PI always receives a payoff of one unit for each
J
move, and the expected accumulated payment received by PI is simply
the expected number of moves. When each move takes the same length
of time, we may, of course, also interpret this payoff as the expected
duration of the game. In one of the games in Charnes and Schroeder [5],
we show how to incorporate both of these payoffs in the same formulation.
In particular, PI attempts to maximize the probability of detection while
constraining the expected number of moves to be no more than a specified
number.
Finally, we show that the infinite sequential game reduces to an
ordinary matrix game when PI attempts to minimize the expected number
of moves. From the above discussion, we take all a. . = 1 for the ex-





For search problems, PI wants to choose a mixed strategy X to
28

minimize the expected number of moves. Therefore, we seek to solve
the equation
min max' 1 1
(24) v = Y X^Y X^Y
Clearly, v, X, and Y satisfy (24) if they satisfy
L _ max min xt y „ ± t Q . _
v X Y
Hence, PI can minimax the expected number of moves by maximin-
ing the probability that the game terminates in one move. This is a
noteworthy feature of the infinite sequential game. Of course, in this
case our perturbation technique is not required since we can solve the
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